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Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem. Binding, a process where different 
sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process 
similar to associative learning. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some 
form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing 
to consciousness. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different 
forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. It is based on the formation 
of semblance of sensory stimulus from (1) synaptic semblances when excitatory postsynaptic 
potentials arrive at functionally LINKed postsynaptic membranes, and (2) network semblances 
when these potentials summate to elicit action potential initiating activity in a network of 
neurons. It is then possible to derive a framework for consciousness as a multi-dimensional 
semblance. According to this framework, a continuum of semblances formed from background 
sensory stimuli and oscillating neuronal activities serve to maintain consciousness. Feasibility 
of this framework to explain various physiological and pathological states of consciousness, 
its subjective nature and qualia is examined.
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While deriving the present framework, theoretical explanations 
for the following were taken as essential criteria for consciousness. 
(1) A feasible explanation for qualia is regarded as the gold standard 
of explanations for consciousness. This is from the view that once 
a framework of consciousness is developed, then the problem of 
qualia can be understood better (Crick and Koch, 1998). (2) The 
discovery of a mechanism that can explain subjective qualities 
(first-person perspective) of conscious experience is an important 
parameter of success for deriving a framework of consciousness 
(Searle, 1992, 1997). (3) A feasible mechanism to accommodate the 
Zombie phenomenon (Koch and Crick, 2001), where meaningful 
motor activities can be performed without conscious awareness of 
them. (4) A mechanism explaining consciousness as a graded, not 
all-or-none, phenomenon, as evidenced by the varying degrees of 
loss of consciousness in many clinical settings of acute brain stem 
injury (Alkire et al., 2008).
A broader degree of philosophical reasoning for the present 
framework of consciousness was made by integrating information 
from different fields of brain sciences. The problem was approached 
by broadening the definition for consciousness by incorporating (1) 
conscious state, often referred as not required for implicit memory 
but needed for episodic memory, and (2) consciousness (that is lost 
during comatose state), which is required for implicit memory. An 
inductive reasoning approach was used to derive the relationship 
between consciousness and other brain functions that have a proven 
direct association with some of the plastic changes at the synapses. 
Following this, the present work examines the framework’s suit-
ability to explain various physiological and pathological conditions 
associated with conscious states. An abstract of this work was pre-
sented at the “Toward a Science of Consciousness” conference, at 
Tucson, Arizona (Vadakkan, 2010).
IntroductIon
Consciousness is described as a biological and therefore, physi-
cal feature of certain higher-level nervous systems of humans 
and a large number of different types of animals (Searle, 1995). 
Consciousness is viewed as a hard problem (Chalmers, 1995). 
Biochemical, electrophysiological, and systems-level studies of 
the neuronal activities have not allowed us to cross the chasm 
of consciousness (Blackmore, 2002). However, there is general 
agreement that brain processes are responsible for conscious-
ness (McGinn, 1989; Searle, 1997) and that finding a perfect 
match between the contents of the neural and mental states will 
lead to the discovery of what that process is (McGinn, 1989; 
Chalmers, 1998). Many investigators have suggested that it is 
time to approach the problem aggressively with new theories 
(Gray, 1992) and scientific methods (Farah and Murphy, 2009; 
Koch, 2009).
Many examinations of the relationship between consciousness 
and neuronal activities have been made in the past, particularly 
by examining the continuity in neuronal activity as a possible 
candidate that can produce a conscious state without any breaks. 
Oscillatory neuronal networks and their significance in regards 
to  the  conscious  representation  of  visual  sensory  inputs  have 
been studied extensively (Lamme and Spekreijse, 2000; Babiloni 
et al., 2004; Tallon-Baudry, 2009; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009). 
Different frameworks for consciousness based on neuronal activity 
were made and are being examined (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; 
Crick and Koch, 2003; Tononi, 2004; Orpwood, 2007; Rolls, 2007; 
Seth, 2008; He and Raichle, 2009). Even though it is thought that 
activity patterns and causal interactions between specific groups of 
neurons could be responsible for consciousness, what constitutes 
consciousness is not yet known.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  2
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1961; von der Malsburg, 1981). Out of all the binding problems, 
the problem of consciousness is considered as the most mystifying 
(Roskies, 1999).
Most of the natural events in the environment cause changes 
such that they evoke simultaneous novel inputs to more than one 
sensory system. For example, the ripening of a banana changes its 
color from green to yellow. The ripening also leads to changes in the 
consistency of the banana and thus in the quality of touch. There 
is a change in taste and the banana becomes edible. The yellow-
soft-taste sensory triad creates binding such that either one of these 
sensations will be sufficient to provide the semblance of the other 
two sensations. The ability of the yellow color of the banana to 
provide us with the semblance that it is edible is the consequence 
of binding. To understand binding, the representations of different 
sensations from an item and their interaction within the nervous 
system during binding need to be explored.
The simultaneous arrival of different sensory inputs from one 
single item can create changes in the nervous system such that at 
a later point of time, the arrival of one of the sensory inputs will 
evoke the semblance of arrival of the matching sensations from the 
same item. This can be viewed as a property of nervous systems 
with multiple sensory systems. Using reductionistic approaches, 
we sought to discover synaptic plasticity changes that could evoke 
appropriate changes during the initial exposure to the item such 
that at a later occasion, one of the sensory inputs from the item 
could evoke sensory semblance for the second item. In other words, 
we examined the elements that are required at the synapses to syn-
thesize a virtual sensation of the remaining sensations from an item 
when one sensation is activated.
Normally, the arrival of activity from a stimulus at the presy-
napse (presynaptic terminal) evokes the activation of its postsy-
napse (postsynaptic terminal or dendritic spine). Activity reaches 
the presynapse in the form of an action potential and induces an 
excitatory postsynaptic potential (EPSP) at the postsynapse after 
neurotransmission. It must be argued that for a sensory semblance 
to occur, the synapse that is normally activated by one sensation 
needs to acquire the ability to get activated by the second sensation 
after the nervous system is exposed simultaneously to both these 
sensations coming from a single item.
To narrow down the requirements within the synaptic struc-
ture, using a reductionistic approach, the following question was 
asked: “What is the minimum statement that is required, in order 
to say that one synapse is activated?” Activation of a postsynapse 
takes place when neurotransmission occurs from its presynaptic 
terminal. Therefore, the activation of the postsynapse can be taken 
as the minimum requirement to state that one synapse is activated. 
Reframing some of the earlier statements, it can be said that co-
activation of the postsynapses from the two different sensory inputs 
from an item induces specific changes that will later allow one of 
the stimuli alone to evoke the activation of the postsynapse that 
was originally activated by the second sensory item. In order to 
achieve this, the postsynapses of the synapses that are activated by 
the two different sensory inputs from the item should be located 
in close proximity. Since different sensory inputs converge at many 
locations within the brain, possible changes that can take place at 
these locations were examined in hopes of substantiating various 
properties of consciousness.
the context
Studies from various fields of brain sciences have clearly shown 
that some form of memory is directly associated with conscious-
ness. Short-term memory is thought to be an essential component 
necessary for consciousness (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1997). 
Higher-order consciousness is viewed as dependent on memory for 
symbols and meanings in the language circuits (Edelman, 1992). 
With regard to visual consciousness, some form of very short-term 
transient memory lasting for only a fraction of a second is thought 
to be essential for consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1998). Using 
experimental results from a very small number of cases, it has been 
suggested that semantic memory and general knowledge may con-
tribute to the conscious features of the subjects (Rosenbaum et al., 
2007). Conscious machines are thought to require the activation 
of some memory representations of a device with a certain kind of 
structure (Minsky, 1991). Since some form of memory is considered 
to be associated with consciousness, it is reasonable to examine 
whether a framework for consciousness can be derived from the 
basic units of memory.
There are two challenging issues that have prevented us from 
proceeding further. First, the basic mechanism for memory storage 
is still not known. Second, different forms of memories are thought 
to have different mechanisms of operation. A feasible approach that 
can be used at this juncture will be to (1) find a proposal of memory 
storage that has a common basic unit capable of explaining different 
types of memories, and (2) find the relationship of the basic unit 
with the synaptic functions and use the information to develop a 
framework for consciousness. The framework can then be tested 
theoretically by examining the relationship between consciousness 
and memory. Using this method, a framework of consciousness was 
made from the basic units of the semblance hypothesis of memory 
(Vadakkan, 2008). Only general principles are explained, leaving 
aside the specific roles of different sub-regions of the brain such 
as the reticular activating system, frontal cortex, thalamus, and 
basal ganglia.
derIvatIon of the framework
The derivation is carried out in two steps. Step one is the derivation 
of the semblance formation. This is followed by the derivation of 
the framework of consciousness.
Step 1: BIndIng and SemBlance formatIon
The nervous system is endowed with the property of making asso-
ciations among different sensory inputs. This can be argued to 
occur due to the facts that (1) most of the items (“item” means 
anything that relates to the real world) can induce more than one 
sensation in the nervous system of an animal having multiple sen-
sory systems, and (2) most animals have nervous systems that can 
perceive more than one sense. Therefore, while perceiving an item, 
an animal’s nervous system simultaneously receives different sensa-
tions from the item and makes a meaningful association between 
those different sensory inputs (This is similar to learning). The 
combinatorial activation pattern of different sensory inputs from 
an item could possibly induce specific signatures in the nervous 
system for identifying the item at a later stage, when more than 
one item with similar sensory inputs are present. This has been 
described as an explicit association, namely “binding” (Rosenblatt, www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  3
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A large number of different items can induce the activation of 
the postsynapses B or D and induce synaptic semblance at the syn-
apse on the opposite side of the functional LINK. Thus, even though 
the functional LINK was formed during binding from a specific 
item, it can be reactivated by activities of either postsynapses B or D 
induced by different items. In this context, functional LINKs can 
be regarded as transferable both during binding and retrieval of 
bound sensory features representing an item.
Concurrent with the synaptic semblance, the EPSPs reaching the 
postsynapses through the functional LINKs can travel down to the 
dendritic tree of the next neuronal order. These EPSPs can undergo 
spatial and/or temporal summation inducing an action potential 
at the axon hillock of the neuron. The activity from this neuron 
propagates in the downstream network of neurons that belong to 
the second sensory stimulus. Activation of these neurons induces 
a network semblance (Figure 3) that creates the   hallucination of 
receiving a large subset of the sensory inputs from the second 
sensory stimulus. From the combined effects of the synaptic and 
network semblances, the nervous system will be able to receive the 
virtual sensation of a second sensory stimulus.
In order to translate the semblances to the characteristic fea-
tures of the virtual sensation of the second stimulus, the follow-
ing inductive reasoning approach is used. What does semblance 
means to sensory perception? In other words, how can we derive 
the sensory quality of a semblance? To answer this question, the 
sensory equivalent of activity at one presynapse need to be figured 
out as follows. Let us imagine that synaptic semblance occurs at the 
postsynapse D (Figure 2). Let presynapse C belongs to   neuron Z 
Experimental studies in neuroscience have not yet identified 
any structural changes between the postsynapses of neighboring 
synapses at locations where sensory inputs converge. Based on the 
derivation that was made in the above paragraph, we hypothesize 
the formation of a functional LINK (capital letters are used in 
the word LINK to denote its significance) between the postsyn-
apses (Figure 1) at locations where synapses from different sensory 
inputs converge. Features of functional LINKs are discussed in a 
separate section.
At a later stage, when one sensory stimulus reaches its synapses 
and postsynaptic membranes, the functional LINKs can be reac-
tivated such that EPSP can spread from these postsynapses to the 
neighboring functionally LINKed postsynapses that belong to the 
second sensory stimulus, causing the latter’s activation to spark the 
semblance of the arrival of that sensation (Figure 2) (mechanisms 
other than the spread of EPSP through the functional LINKs were 
also discussed, Vadakkan, 2008). The LINK is called “functional” 
since (1) LINK formation is a function of the simultaneous activa-
tion of different sensory receptors during initial exposures to the 
item (learning), and (2) reactivation of the LINK is a function of 
the arrival of EPSP at either one of the postsynapses.
Activation of a postsynapse without corresponding activation of 
its presynapse will provoke the virtual sensation of activity arriv-
ing at the presynapse from the sensory receptors of the second 
sensation. This is called synaptic semblance. Semblance means that 
the postsynapse that receives EPSP through the functional LINK 
experiences the cellular hallucination that it has received an action 
potential-induced synaptic transmission from its presynapse.
FIgure 1 | Illustration showing the formation of functional LINK 
between two postsynaptic membranes B and D during binding. The 
functional LINK is transient and is a function of the simultaneous arrival of 
sensory stimuli from an item at the two postsynaptic membranes during 
binding. This is hypothesized to occur at locations of convergence of sensory 
inputs. Reactivation of the functional LINK is possible during the arrival of 
activity at either one of the postsynapses (B or D) at a later time (This figure is 
used after modification [Vadakkan, 2008] with permission from iUniverse 
publishers, Bloomington, IN, USA). 
FIgure 2 | As a result of the binding, when a single sensory stimulus 
from an item reaches the presynaptic terminal A, it depolarizes its 
postsynaptic membrane B, and the resulting ePSP spreads through the 
functional LINK to postsynaptic membrane D. This evokes the cellular 
hallucination at postsynapse D of an action potential reaching its presynaptic 
terminal, C. This is called “synaptic semblance” . Note that a functional LINK 
can be reactivated by EPSP reaching it from either postsynapse B or D (This 
figure is used after modification (Vadakkan, 2008) with permission from 
iUniverse publishers, Bloomington, IN, USA).Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  4
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receptor map that represents possible sensory locations which 
can contribute to the activation of presynapse C (Figure 4D). 
This sensory receptor map provides the characteristic features 
of the virtual sensation that is produced by synaptic semblance 
occurring at the postsynapses.
Since the number of sensory receptors is finite, a large number 
of sensory inputs from various items can reactivate one functional 
LINK that was initially formed by binding of sensory stimuli from 
one item. Therefore, these functional LINKs will be shared for bind-
ing of sensory stimuli from different items. This property can be 
called transferability of the functional LINKs.
The net effect of synaptic and network semblances occurring 
during the activation of one sensation from an item that results 
in the virtual sensation of the second sensation in the latter’s 
absence can be called functional semblance. By computing sem-
blances (sensory receptor maps) from all the activated postsyn-
apses, the quality of the functional semblance can be understood. 
The combination of semblances from different postsynapses at 
one neuronal order (that are activated almost simultaneously) 
(Figure 4C) and the permutation of these combination products 
occurring at the consecutive neuronal orders in a temporal fashion 
will result in a multi-dimensional net semblance (Figure 4D). 
The configuration of this net semblance is a function of the 
complexity of the nervous system and will depend on (1) the 
genetic make-up of the animal that determines the structural 
LINKs (structural LINKs can be explained as LINKs between 
the postsynaptic membranes that are genetically determined and 
are responsible for innate behaviors), number of neurons, orders 
of neurons, neuronal organization and convergence pattern of 
sensory inputs, and (2) functional LINKs acquired during life 
from previous binding events.
Step 2: derIvatIon of the framework for conScIouSneSS
Continuous formation of semblances is required for the forma-
tion of uninterrupted functional semblance for consciousness. The 
main inputs that provide a continuum of neuronal activities in the 
nervous system include:
(1)  Background sensory inputs. Since an animal cannot possibly 
shut down all sensory inputs, its nervous system continues 
to receive background sensory stimuli from the environ-
ment. As a result, many sensory receptors are activated. This 
will induce many synaptic and network semblances con-
tributing  to  the  formation  of  C-semblance.  C-semblance 
and consciousness are used interchangeably depending on 
the context.
(2)  Neuronal oscillations. The cortex and hippocampus undergo 
oscillating neuronal activities both during wake-state and 
sleep. The sets of neurons that are oscillating are unlikely 
to get activated in the same order during any specific bin-
ding events or retrieval of bound sensations. The oscillating 
population of neurons will induce semblances by reactiva-
ting the functional LINKs at their synapses. Since neuronal 
oscillation occurs in a population of neurons that are highly 
non-selective for retrieval of any specific sensory item, the 
synaptic and network semblances induced can be viewed as 
contributing to C-semblance.
(Figures 4A,B). Neuron Z, in turn, can only be depolarized by 
activating a set of axonal terminals belonging to the neurons that 
synapse to the dendritic spines (postsynapses) on neuron Z’s den-
dritic tree.
The spatial summation of nearly 40 EPSPs or the temporal 
summation of much less than 40 EPSPs at the soma of neuron Z 
can trigger an action potential. Therefore, it is possible that activ-
ity from a multitude of possible combinations of any 40 EPSPs 
(from spatial summation) or permutations of less than 40 EPSPs 
(from temporal summation) arriving to the neuron Z’s nearly 
4 × 104 dendritic spines has the ability to trigger the same action 
potential.
Let us imagine that the dendritic tree of neuron Z receives 
activity from a set of neurons {Y} through existing synaptic con-
nections that they make with the neuron Z. Similar to this, each 
neuron synapsing on the neurons in the neuronal set {Y} in 
turn receives synaptic connections from a set of all the possible 
combinations of neurons upstream from the set of neurons {Y}. 
Let this set of neurons be {X}. By moving in this way in a ret-
rograde fashion toward the sensory level, sets of neurons at the 
preceding neuronal orders can be determined. The last step of 
this process will determine the set of sensory receptors whose 
activation can theoretically cause the activation of presynapse C. 
These sensory receptors are superimposed to obtain the sensory 
FIgure 3 | Schematic representation of activation of a partial neuronal 
network occurring during the arrival of one sensory stimulus from an 
item after binding (the initial formation of the functional LINK). As 
explained in Figure 2, synaptic semblances are formed at each of the 
postsynapses marked D. In addition, the EPSPs from all the “Dn” 
postsynapses can summate (provided spatial and/or temporal summation of 
sufficient number of EPSPs is possible) to elicit an action potential at the axon 
hillock of neuron N. Neuron N belongs to the second sensation. Activating 
neuron N will induce the activation of a partial neuronal network that belongs 
to the second sensory item inducing network semblance.www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  5
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Dynamics of the formation of C-semblance
The contribution of synaptic and network semblances from differ-
ent regions of the brain that contribute to the C-semblance may 
vary. Studying isolated lesions of different parts of the brain can 
help us understand these regional contributions. Brain lesions 
occurring at different brain locations lead to different levels of 
unconscious states (Bernat, 2009). Moderate-sized lesions of the 
cortex are unlikely to affect consciousness as evidenced by reports 
of lack of changes in conscious states even after the surgical removal 
of large portions of cortex (Austin and Grant, 1958). It is possible 
that semblance formation has uniform distribution in the cortex 
and that there are an excess of functional LINKs in the cortex than 
that are required to contribute to the formation of C-semblance.
Abrupt loss of consciousness at a critical concentration of an 
anesthetic agent suggests that the integrated mechanism underlying 
consciousness collapse non-linearly (Alkire et al., 2008). From this, 
it may be interpreted that the opposite is possible during the forma-
tion of C-semblance. That is, the conscious state is built from its ele-
ments as a non-linear exponential function. This means that most 
of the time, there are more semblances than what is required for 
C-semblance. This may explain why consciousness is not affected by 
the surgical removal of a portion of the cortex (Austin and Grant, 
1958). On the other hand, changes that can affect the functional 
LINKs globally, for example, metabolic, electrolyte and toxic effects, 
may affect C-semblance quickly.
Synchronization of many neuronal activities required for oscil-
latory network may be useful in maintaining C-semblance. Firstly, 
it may contribute to a continuum of neuronal activities, without 
Net functional semblance resulting from the background sen-
sory inputs and neuronal oscillations can be viewed as primary 
semblance, namely C-semblance, intrinsic to the net semblance 
formation at a given period in an animal’s development. This 
C-semblance is the basis for consciousness.
C-semblance is a function of the reactivated structural LINKs 
(which are a function of the complexity of the neuronal archi-
tecture of a given species) and functional LINKs (which in turn, 
are a function of the binding events that occurred prior to the 
time point when consciousness is tested) during background 
neuronal activity. The optimum possible C-semblance that can 
be elicited is considered species-specific. Variations in the indi-
vidual features of the C-semblance can occur depending on (1) 
the number of functional LINKs formed during life, and (2) 
the number of functional LINKs reactivated by the background 
neuronal activities.
Dimensions of C-semblance
The net C-semblance is formed from the integration of all the 
synaptic and network semblances occurring at different orders 
of neurons. Due to the normal synaptic delay, semblances occur 
at different neuronal orders at different time points, requiring 
time as one of the dimensions for integration. Oscillating nature 
of the neuronal network is also likely to add new dimensions 
based on the phase of the oscillation. The final integration prod-
uct is a multi-dimensional semblance that leads to the virtual 
sensation of some non-specific sensory stimuli, which is called 
C-semblance (Figure 5).
FIgure 4 | Schematic representation of the formation of net semblance 
from synaptic and network semblances. (A) Cartoon showing the formation 
of semblance at one of the presynapses C of the neuron Z when its 
corresponding postsynapse D (see Figure 2) is activated through the functional 
LINK. The semblance of activity at the presynaptic terminal C indicate that the 
activity could be arriving from the neuron Z which in turn could be receiving 
activation from a set of neurons {Y}. In this manner, we can extrapolate the 
location of neurons of the penultimate orders in a retrograde fashion until we 
reach the sensory receptors. The final sensory receptor group is represented by 
the line MN which represents the identity of the sensation. From the sensory 
stimulation point of view, this reflects the fact that stimulation of the sensory 
receptors on the line MN can activate the presynaptic terminal C. (B) A is 
summarized and drawn as an isosceles triangle and it represents the 
semblance from the level of one synapse or neuron to the sensory level. 
(C) Formation of net semblance from a single order of neurons N8. The darkness 
of the shaded triangles represents overlapping of the semblances that 
determine the identity of the sensation. The darkest triangular area represents 
the net semblance which in turn determines the identity of the retrieved 
sensation. The dotted line on the top represents identity of the sensation 
occurring from a single order of neurons. (D) Schematic representation 
illustrating the formation of semblances from multiple neuronal orders which are 
integrated to form multi-dimensional net semblance representing the identity of 
the sensation to be retrieved. The dotted cube on the top represents the 
multi-dimensional nature of the semblance. (This figure is used after 
modification [Vadakkan, 2008] with permission from iUniverse publishers, 
Bloomington, IN, USA).Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  6
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  during life. Individuals of a species living in a given environment 
will   associatively bind (learn) the sensory qualities of almost all the 
items and this is likely to lead to the formation of almost identical 
functional LINKs within their nervous systems. The evolving simi-
larities in the structural and functional LINKs can lead to similar 
C-semblances. Depending on the variations in binding that tak-
ing place in each individual, the nervous system develops different 
number and locations of functional LINKs. These differences are 
discussed under subjective qualities of C-semblance.
Age of the nervous system. Since functional LINKs are likely absent 
in a newborn animal, C-semblance will depend on the geneti-
cally determined structural LINKs between certain postsynapses, 
called (S → F) LINKs. As the number of binding events an animal 
undergoes increases, the number of functional LINKs will increase. 
Since C-semblance in newborn and adult animals varies due to 
the differences in the number of functional LINKs, the nature of 
any breaks, required for maintaining consciousness. In conditions 
where the synchrony is broken, it may affect C-semblance. An 
example of such a condition is absence seizure where conscious 
states are affected transiently only for a few seconds. Secondly, the 
synchronized network activity acts as a baseline upon which envi-
ronmental sensory inputs can induce semblances for memories of 
associated sensations from different items in the environment. In 
these respects, synchronization of the neuronal activities may be 
considered as a binding factor.
Determinants of C-semblance
Species specificity. Every individual within a species is different in 
the specific number of neurons and fine details of connectivity 
patterns within its nervous system. However, all members of a spe-
cies have a general organization that (1) provides similar distri-
bution of structural LINKs at similar locations, and (2) provides 
opportunities for the formation of almost similar functional LINKs 
FIgure 5 | Cartoon showing the formation of primary semblance for 
consciousness (C-semblance) from the semblances at the LINKed 
postsynapses as a result of the neuronal oscillations (represented by the 
wave form) and background sensory inputs (representative inputs are 
marked as 2 and 3 from the line PQ which represents the environment). 
Note the elliptical-shaped net functional semblance C representing 
consciousness. Around the elliptical-shaped C-semblance, is a wave-shaped 
extension that represents the subjective variations of C-semblance among the 
members of a species. Note the center-surround configuration of the 
C-semblance. The center denotes the species-specific features and the surround 
represents the subjective elements of the C-semblance. Formation of 
secondary semblances for qualia of blueness of the blue (Qb-semblance) and 
sensation of pain (Qp-semblance) are shown. For simplicity, synapses are drawn 
intersecting the wave form instead of the neuronal soma. The synaptic 
structures and their labeling are from Figure 2. Qb and Qp semblances depend 
on the C-semblance and are shown by their overlap. Semblances from the 
sensory inputs from the items in the environment (represented by sensory 
inputs marked 1 and 4 from the line PQ) provide qualia for the evoked 
sensation. C, C-semblance (consciousness semblance); Cs, subjective 
consciousness semblance.www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  7
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tion takes place at the level of the subject and only exists for the 
subject (Schopenhauer, 1844). In this context, there are concerns 
that attempts to associate consciousness to physical properties of 
the nervous system will lead to negligence of the subjective quali-
ties of the conscious experience (Searle, 1992, 1997). Therefore, a 
framework for consciousness is expected to incorporate features 
that can explain these subjective qualities.
C-semblances are expected to be broadly similar among the 
age-matched members of a species with normal brain functions 
living in similar environmental conditions. With regard to its fine 
details, C-semblance is likely to be specific to individual nervous 
systems at any specific time point. As discussed in the earlier sec-
tions, C-semblance is the net effect of the semblances evoked by 
background neuronal activities. These background neuronal activi-
ties can be either induced by or promote reactivation of the func-
tional LINKs formed as a result of specific sensory associations in 
the nervous system during life. Therefore, depending on the specific 
functional LINKs present in an individual nervous system, there 
will be subjective variations in the C-semblance (Figure 5).
For the purpose of simplicity by making pictorial representa-
tions, it may be assumed that the C-semblance has a center-surround 
conformation with center representing the basic C-semblance and 
the surround representing the subjective variations in conscious-
ness depending on previous binding events (Figure 5). Since sem-
blances are formed only through previously formed functional and 
structural LINKs, sensing the objective world will inevitably include 
semblances occurring through the functional LINKs formed during 
previous binding occurred in an individual.
Another major feature of the subjective aspect of consciousness 
is the awareness of “self,” which is explained as the experiential 
sense of being a vital and self-coinciding subject of experience or 
first-person perspective on the world (Sass and Parnas, 2003). The 
present framework provides provisions to explain how this sensa-
tion can arise. Associative binding takes place between our physical 
body and our actions. Thus, associative binding occurs between 
the owner of actions and the actions themselves. From this it can 
be seen that actions, from an individual, specific to the individual 
form semblance for the owner that provides the sensation of self. 
This feature of “self” depends on the functional LINKs formed 
from previous binding events.
QualIa
It is expected that a framework for consciousness should be able 
to support different functional features of qualia (Dennett, 1988; 
Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1997; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 
2001). The perception of the blueness of blue, the painfulness 
of pain and a certain sound as noise, requires the operation of 
a mechanism beyond arrival of sensory inputs from the sensory 
endings to the higher neuronal orders. This is one of the reasons 
for the difficulty in formulating a mechanism for consciousness 
(Chalmers, 1995; Shear, 1997; Crick and Koch, 1998).
Based on the present hypothesis qualia can be viewed as second-
ary semblances namely, qualia semblances (Q-semblances) which 
are innate to a species, and modified through developmental stages. 
For example, the color semblance (Qc-semblance) can be viewed 
as the net effect of all the semblances evoked at different   neuronal 
orders initiated by the activation of color-specific cones. Since 
consciousness may also vary. Since the conscious state is built from 
semblances in a non-linear exponential function (discussed in the 
previous section), the net semblance values after the curve becomes 
an asymptote indicates that the C-semblances of all members of a 
species with the same age and environmental exposure are nearly 
the same.
Interactions of the sensory systems. Injuries of the sensory pathways 
(Guberman and Stuss, 1983; Steinke et al., 1992) can disrupt con-
sciousness. Acute injuries that damage the brain stem may cause 
sensory deficits that can evoke an unconscious state (Parvizi and 
Damasio, 2003). Closure of the eyes induces changes in the electro-
encephalogram (EEG) wave forms due to changes in the oscillatory 
pattern of the cortical neurons. This is capable of initiating further 
changes in the configuration of the wake-state C-semblance. As the 
sleep cycle progresses, the EEG waveforms keep changing indicating 
concurrent changes in the configuration of the C-semblance even-
tually leading to various stages of unconscious stages of sleep.
c-SemBlance and ItS relatIon to other SemBlanceS
The primary C-semblance is viewed as resulting from the sem-
blances formed from background neuronal activity. In addition, 
there are many semblances that are formed in response to specific 
internal or external sensory inputs. Classifying them may provide 
a better understanding of different types of semblances and their 
similarities and differences in operation. Secondary semblances 
are  evoked  by  specific  sensory  stimuli  that  reactivate  specific 
functional LINKs. There are two types of secondary semblances: 
(1) innate semblances that are modified through developmental 
stages. Examples include those responsible for sight, sound, smell, 
touch, taste, and pain, (2) semblances formed through the func-
tional LINKs and were acquired through binding. Examples include 
memory and path finding.
Tertiary semblances can occur when a novel sensory stimulus 
is presented to a nervous system that has already completed many 
binding events in the past. The nervous system uses combina-
tions, permutations, and transferability properties to induce net 
semblances as a response to this novel cue stimulus. Depending 
on the number of binding events carried out in the past, the nerv-
ous system can produce peaks of net semblances that provide 
novel response patterns. They can interact with external evidence 
that allows sensory data to veto or support internal constructs 
which is regarded as a requirement of a system with cognitive 
abilities (Abbott, 2008). Both secondary and tertiary semblances 
are likely to depend on the stability of the conformation of the 
primary C-semblance. The details of their interaction will need 
further exploration.
SuBjectIve QualItIeS of c-SemBlance
According to philosophical idealism, things that we perceive around 
us are the subjective creation of our minds and we have no possibil-
ity of knowing what the real world is like (Kant, 1781). Idealism 
also denies that what we perceive is part of the physical world 
(Behrendt, 2010). It is viewed that we have no real access to the 
objective world since we are observing it through our subjective 
conscious experience (Solomon, 1988). There is an undifferentiated 
world which exists independently of the observer and differentia-Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  8
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future. Here, the present framework is examined using currently 
available data from various physiological and pathological condi-
tions of consciousness.
Anesthesia
Anesthetic agents cause the inactivation of a complex brain region 
in the posterior parietal area (Alkire et al., 2008). At low doses of 
anesthetics, the sustained firing of neurons during normal aroused 
brain states changes to a bi-stable burst-pause pattern (Llinas and 
Steriade,  2006)  and  oscillates  between  a  depolarized  up-state 
and a hyperpolarized down-state (Steriade et al., 2001). The lat-
ter is characterized by complete stoppage of synaptic activity for 
0.1 s or more. At higher concentrations of anesthetics, the down-
state becomes more prolonged, inducing prolonged stoppage of 
synaptic activity.
It is possible that in the absence of synaptic activity, functional 
LINKs stop functioning, leading to a lack of formation of sem-
blances, resulting in unconsciousness. Since time is one of the 
dimensions that determine the conformation of the C-semblance 
(by contributing to the permutation of semblances from different 
neuronal orders that occur at different time points due to synaptic 
delay) any break in the continuity of activity in the neuronal orders 
will lead to disturbance in consciousness.
Seizure disorders
It is known that during seizure activity, a large portion of the 
cortico–thalamic complex is engaged in strong hyper-synchro-
nous stereotypic activity (Hudetz and Imas, 2007; Kroeger and 
Amzica, 2007). Since a very large number of non-specific neu-
rons fire during a seizure activity, the semblances occurring at 
the postsynapses will add up to form a very large non-specific 
net semblance that changes the conformation of C-semblance. 
This supports the idea that C-semblance requires a specific 
conformation (or at least a range of feasible conformations) 
for consciousness.
Sleep
During sleep, there is breakdown of cortical effective connec-
tivity (Massimini et al., 2005). Similar to the bi-stable state 
seen with anesthetics, the hyperpolarized down-states induced 
by sleep involve changes in background neuronal oscillations, 
as evidenced by EEG wave form changes (Sanchez-Vives and 
McCormick,  2000). As  neuronal  oscillatory  patterns  change, 
the conformation of net semblance changes and results in loss 
of consciousness.
Hypoxia and hypoglycemia
These can lead to a reduction in the levels of consciousness possibly 
by interfering with the reactivation of functional LINKs required 
for  sufficient  semblances  for  the  formation  of  C-semblances. 
Consequent to the defects in consciousness, this can lead to defects 
in secondary and tertiary semblances.
Chronic consciousness disorders and delirium
The spectrum of clinical conditions of chronic disorders of con-
sciousness range from minimally conscious state to coma (Bernat, 
2009). It is possible that with each of these conditions, there is 
qualia can only be appreciated in a conscious state, Q-semblances 
will be dependent on the specific configuration of the primary 
C-semblance. Similar to the C-semblance, Q-semblances are also 
multi-dimensional in character and are formed by the combina-
tion and permutation of semblances. Q-semblances are dynamic in 
nature and are a function of reactivation of the LINKs by different 
sensory stimuli.
It is likely that in the absence of C-semblance, Q-semblances 
cannot exist. On the contrary, one can imagine conditions having 
C-semblance, without having certain types of Q-semblances. Even 
though these Q-semblances are likely to share majority of the sem-
blances from which they were formed with that of the C-semblance, 
those semblances may not be obligatory for the C-semblance for-
mation. When it comes to the qualia of the consciousness them-
selves, it is possible that their semblances overlap to a great extent 
with that of the C-semblance.
levelS of conScIouS and unconScIouS StateS
Awareness, attention, and the ability to respond to sensory stimuli 
are used to estimate the level of consciousness. Based on the 
defects in these domains, various conscious states can exist. 
According to the present framework, changes in the conforma-
tion of the multi-dimensional C-semblance can explain these 
different states. For example, C-semblance sufficient to remain 
conscious, but not being conscious of a specific motor activity 
leading to a zombie state (Chalmers, 1996; Koch and Crick, 2001) 
is possible. During occasions of specific conformational states 
of C-semblance, a cue stimulus can activate a partial neuro-
nal network stimulating a set of motor neurons (Figure 3) and 
lead to the performance of motor actions without the conscious 
awareness of the action. In a similar way, an inverse zombie-state-
producing anesthesia awareness (Mashour and LaRock, 2008) 
can be explained.
Anoxic and traumatic brain injuries cause different chronic con-
sciousness disorders (Bernat, 2009). In addition, many metabolic 
disorders and medical conditions produce varying levels of con-
sciousness states. Based on the present framework, these disorders 
can induce different changes ranging from the blockage of sensory 
stimuli towards the functional LINKs to inhibition of reactivation 
of the functional LINKs, resulting in lack of formation of appropri-
ate conformation of the C-semblance.
Conscious states are considered separate from attention (Merikle, 
1992; Lamme, 2004; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007). Similar to this, it 
was reported that awareness is not a prerequisite for learning (Clark 
and Squire, 1998). While a conscious state is viewed as a multi-
dimensional C-semblance, attention may be viewed as a process 
required for efficient functional LINK formation for associative 
learning/binding.
SupportIng evIdence
Any account of the neurobiological processes contributing to con-
scious perception has to be compatible with various known rela-
tionships between different brain functions. If semblances from 
postsynaptic activation through the functional LINKs are respon-
sible for consciousness, then by disturbing the factors that maintain 
the functional LINKs, consciousness can be disturbed. This can be 
used as a test to examine the framework for consciousness in the www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  9
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Color perception is time-dependent and involves more neu-
ronal orders than required for the quale of the color white. Since 
eyes cannot fixate on a single color on the rotating wheel for 
sufficient time, the sensory stimuli will not reach a sufficient 
number of neuronal orders. This will reduce the required number 
of neuronal orders from which permutation of semblances needs 
to be computed for the quale of individual colors. This results in 
the lack of quale for individual colors. At high speeds, overlap-
ping of semblances for multiple colors from the initial orders 
of neurons will result in net semblance for color white (Qc-w-
semblance).
According to the present framework, the net semblance for 
color vision requires semblances from more neuronal orders than 
are required for the color white. Patients with cortical achromat-
opsia are color blind; but they can see the color white. It is likely 
that in these patients, semblances are not formed at the higher 
orders of neurons and thus not contributed to the formation 
of net semblance for individual colors. Based on the present 
framework, it is possible to find lesions affecting connections 
to the higher orders or neuronal loss at the higher orders in 
these patients.
Modulations of conscious experience
A previous work (Bottini et al., 1995) has shown that the activa-
tion of the vestibular system aided conscious tactile perception in 
an individual who had lost all abilities of tactile perception due 
to damage of the sensory pathways of touch at areas before its 
convergence with the fibers from the vestibular system. Normally, 
vestibular and tactile systems share projections to the putamen, 
insula, somatosensory cortex II, premotor cortex, and supra-
marginal gyrus. The study reported that the vestibular system 
introduced bias in the neural system involved in body representa-
tion. The physiological mechanism of this phenomenon is not 
yet known.
Based on the present framework, many functional LINKs would 
have formed between the vestibular system and the pathways gov-
erning touch sensation at the locations of convergence of these 
sensations (in the patient mentioned in the above study, at the 
orders of neurons after the region of brain damage) during life. At 
a later time, vestibular sensations alone can induce semblances at 
the LINKed postsynapses for the touch sensation. The perception 
of touch sensation occurs only in a conscious state.
Binding problem
The identification of synaptic mechanisms that can explain binding 
of association of various sensations has been an unsolved issue for 
many years. From the example of the ripening of a banana, it can 
be seen that the yellow-soft-taste sensory triad creates associative 
functional LINKs between the postsynapses such that either one 
of these sensations will be sufficient to provide the semblance of 
the other two sensations.
functIonal lInks Between the poStSynaptIc memBraneS
Functional LINKs are defined as LINKs that are formed as a func-
tion of simultaneous arrival of EPSPs at the postsynapses that are 
LINKed during binding or reactivated by the arrival of EPSPs at 
either one of the postsynapses during the retrieval process. These 
a corresponding spectrum of multi-dimensional conformations 
of C-semblance. Similarly, delirium is a disorder with fluctuating 
levels of consciousness. Reducing the background sensory stimuli 
can worsen the symptoms of delirium, resulting in reduced con-
scious interactions with the external world. This highlights the 
role of background environmental stimuli in the formation of 
C-semblance.
Thalamic relay of sensory inputs
Activities from almost all sensations pass through different nuclei 
within the thalamus. Since consciousness depends on background 
sensory inputs, blocking their transmission can lead to changes 
in consciousness. The reports that thalamic infarcts cause uncon-
sciousness (Guberman and Stuss, 1983; Steinke et al., 1992) support 
the present framework and explain the contribution of background 
sensory inputs to consciousness. In addition, during sleep thalamic 
neurons undergo a prolonged inhibitory rebound after a single 
burst (Pedroarena and Llinas, 1997), possibly blocking sensory 
stimuli from reaching the functional LINKs, interfering with the 
net semblance formation.
Hippocampus and conscious memory
Lesions of the hippocampus cause selective loss of declarative or 
explicit or conscious memory (Cohen and Squire, 1980). Damage 
to other specific areas of the brain impairs unconscious forms of 
memory (Bechara et al., 1995; Knowlton et al., 1996). It is reported 
that hippocampal networks may be required for awareness of the 
memories of learned item (Eichenbaum, 1999). These findings 
indicate that the convergence of multi-sensory inputs in the hip-
pocampus and the resulting functional LINK formation at the hip-
pocampus and at higher orders of neurons are necessary for specific 
semblances for explicit or conscious memory.
Unconscious memory and goal pursuits
Unconscious associative memory can occur without conscious 
awareness (Chaumon et al., 2008). In one study, re-exposure to an 
odor during sleep that had been presented as context during prior 
learning (Rasch et al., 2007), was shown to improve the retention 
of hippocampus-dependent declarative memories. It is possible 
that the functional LINKs were reactivated during the exposure 
and brought about changes similar to that during repetitive learn-
ing. Similarly, actions can be initiated unconsciously (Custers and 
Aarts, 2010) and can be explained based on the activation of motor 
neurons as a result of the activation of a partial neuronal net-
work (Figure 3).
Color vision
Qualia of color are expected to occur from a specific multi-di-
mensional conformation. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
reducing the number of neuronal orders through which stimuli 
from color travel, will affect the qualia by reducing semblances 
occurring at different neuronal orders. This is observed in the 
following experiment. As the rotating speed of a wheel of colors 
increases, perceptional abilities of individual colors decreases. The 
only color that can be perceived at high speed is white. The difficulty 
in perceiving individual colors at high speeds can be explained 
as follows.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  10
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(d)  Inductive depolarization of one postsynapse by another is 
a feasible mechanism that can be tested. Electroconvulsive 
stimulation (ECS) that alters the level of consciousness 
during the post-procedure period may act through distur-
bing the membrane electrical properties.
2.  At  the  neuronal  level:  Electrophysiological  studies  can  be 
carried out to examine the effect of functional LINKs at the 
neuronal level. A study examining cue-associated learning of 
reward at the thalamo–amygdalar synapses in the lateral amyg-
dala (Tye et al., 2008) had shown an increase in the minia-
ture EPSP (mEPSP) amplitude after the learning event. This 
can be explained as a function of additional AMPA channel 
currents through the functionally LINKed postsynapses. The 
same work also showed learning-induced firing of additional 
neurons in the lateral amygdale. This can be explained in terms 
of activation of a partial neuronal network (Figure 3) through 
the functional LINKs. Since binding can be viewed as an asso-
ciative learning, the above explanations can be further explo-
red to understand the nature of the functional LINKs used in 
building the framework.
3.  At the systems level: Examination of the effect of functional 
LINKs on neuronal oscillation can be studied by testing whe-
ther blocking the functional LINKs can affect the retrieval of 
the bound sensations. fMRI experiments to study the role of 
functional  LINKs  in  achieving  binding  and  its  subsequent 
effect in the retrieval of the identities of the bound sensations 
from an item can be carried out.
4.  At the behavioral level: If different behavioral effects can be 
explained based on the role of functional LINKs, then their 
relationship with consciousness can be examined. For example 
if functional LINKs can be used to explain some of the features 
of schizophrenia, then the relationship between consciousness 
and schizophrenia can be studied.
5.  At the epistemological level: It is possible to examine the fea-
sibility of the functional LINKs as a mechanism to explain 
different brain functions. This will allow us to examine the 
presence  of  any  cross-correlation  between  these  brain  fun-
ctions  and  consciousness.  From  similar  approaches  carried 
out  to  study  the  role  of  the  functional  LINKs  in  memory 
(Vadakkan, 2008), it was observed that oxygen, glucose, dopa-
mine, and amphetamine likely augment the formation of the 
functional LINKs; whereas activation of glycine receptors and 
gamma amino-butyric acid (GABA)-activated chloride chan-
nels, electroconvulsive stimulation and anesthetic agents likely 
block the functional LINKs. The similarities of the effect of 
these agents on memory and consciousness can be explored 
further to understand the nature of the functional LINKs.
SIgnIfIcance of c-SemBlance
C-semblance is viewed as the multi-dimensional virtual sensation 
of a sensory stimulus resulting from background sensory stimuli 
and oscillatory neuronal activities taking place at various levels 
during wake-state. Concurrent with the induction of semblances, 
the EPSPs pass through the functional LINKs to the postsynapses 
(dendritic spines) of the dendritic tree of the next order of neurons 
and induce action potentials, provided sufficient spatial and/or 
are named functional LINKs since their presence is a function of the 
arrival of EPSPs. The transient nature of this process may explain 
the difficulty in exploring its nature. The nature of the functional 
LINKs and its effect on consciousness can be tested at various levels 
as following.
1.  At the synaptic level: It is anticipated that some specific chan-
ges should be taking place between the postsynapses during 
binding that will allow reactivation of the functional LINKs 
during  retrieval  of  the  bound  sensations.  The  following 
potential  mechanisms  that  can  support  the  time-scales  of 
retrieval of the bound sensations or memories require further 
examination.
(a)  Different locations of the nervous system show incre-
ased  blood  oxygenation  level  dependent  (BOLD) 
signal-intensities  in  functional  magnetic  resonance 
imaging  (fMRI)  studies  both  during  learning  and 
memory  retrieval  (Cohen  et  al.,  1999;  LaBar  and 
Cabeza, 2006). It is reasonable to assume that similar 
oxygen requiring processes also take place during bin-
ding. Oxygen is possibly involved not only to provide 
energy  for  the  biological  process,  but  also  directly 
involved in the formation of the functional LINKs. 
Since hippocampus and amygdala are brain regions 
where different sensory inputs converge (Amaral and 
Witter, 1995; Doron and Ledoux, 1999),  it  is  most 
likely that these areas develop large number of fun-
ctional LINKs. A preliminary report suggestive of the 
presence of an oxygenation-state dependent functio-
nal  LINKs  was  previously  made  (Vadakkan,  2008). 
Further exploration of the findings may provide more 
information about the nature of the functional LINKs. 
Role of oxygen in the formation and reactivation of the 
functional LINKs can be tested by using uncouplers of 
oxidative phosphorylation to examine the selective role 
of oxygen in the functional LINK formation. Artificially 
introducing changes at the locations of convergence of 
sensory inputs that can induce formation of functional 
LINKs in experimental conditions may be used to study 
their nature.
(b)  The potential spaces between the synapses namely the 
extracellular  matrix  (ECM)  play  an  important  role  in 
keeping the ionic balance required for maintaining the 
resting membrane potential. Ephaptic changes that can 
be brought about between the postsynaptic membranes 
during binding and its subsequent effect on reactivation 
of either one of the membranes by activation of the other 
can be carried out by biophysical studies.
(c)  Membrane proteins that can sense the arrival of EPSPs in 
the neighboring postsynaptic membranes during retrie-
val of the identities of the bound sensations can induce 
synaptic semblance reminiscent of the arrival of action 
potentials from the latter’s presynaptic terminals. Proteins 
that can sense the sequence of ionic changes in the com-
mon ECM space during the arrival of action potential 
may provide valuable information.www.frontiersin.org  October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  11
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be added and the word “and” elicit another semblance that con-
tributes to the conscious experience of the process. For example, 
the word “and” in a mathematical context can bring conscious 
experience of a plus (+) sign. In the context of mixing two differ-
ent colors, one would consciously experience the word “and” as 
mixing them together.
Unique conscious experiences in very complex circumstances are 
often difficult to explain. However, the present framework provides 
innumerable combinatorial and permutation possibilities that can 
create a large number of complex multi-dimensional semblances 
from nearly 1015 synapses that are located in multiple neuronal 
orders. It is possible that retrieval of semblances by certain sensa-
tions can cause collapse of the multi-dimensional conformation 
of C-semblance, similar to discontinuity in the graphs of certain 
calculus functions leading to loss of consciousness.
The present framework has applied new assumptions that bind-
ing introduces reversible changes at the level of synapses and during 
retrieval a virtual sense of the bound sensations is created. The 
present work explains consciousness using a framework derived 
from synaptic plasticity changes. Even though the present work 
has shown several supportive evidences, empirical verification of 
the functional LINKs needs to be undertaken. It may be possible 
to carry out experimental approaches to manipulate the functional 
LINKs in order to study their effects on consciousness. In addition, 
it may also become possible to translate the framework for experi-
ments in physical systems.
The present framework raises many challenging questions. How 
many orders of neurons are required for the conscious state? Can 
machines have consciousness? Is it wrong to assume that a machine 
that suitably simulates human brain has consciousness (Minsky, 
1986)? Computational work may help to estimate the threshold 
numbers of neuronal orders that can produce the final effective 
semblance for consciousness. Since consciousness is a property 
of the internal state of the nervous system, devising methods to 
express it using proper read-outs may allow us to understand its 
nature. The present framework should be treated as unproven until 
it is verified against further supporting evidence.
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temporal summation of EPSPs occurs. During these events, the 
dendritic trees of many neurons will be short of sufficient EPSPs to 
induce action potentials at their axonal hillocks. In these neurons 
that are activated by the background sensory stimuli and neuronal 
oscillations, the summated EPSPs reaching at sub-threshold levels 
provide important physiological functions.
At this stage where background neuronal activities that continue 
to evoke C-semblance keeping the animal conscious, a new cue 
stimulus reaching the nervous system induces additional functional 
LINKs that add minor increments in EPSPs and can trigger an 
action potential in the above-mentioned neurons (that belong to 
the second sensation) that are otherwise activated at sub-threshold 
levels. Activation of a set of neurons that belong to one sensa-
tion from an item will provide network semblance for retrieval of 
sensory features from other sensations. This enables the nervous 
system to utilize the property of binding for its functions. Thus, 
maintenance of C-semblance aids in retrieval of additional sensory 
features of an item when only one sensation from the item reaches 
the nervous system. The same mechanism can explain memory 
retrieval after learning.
dIScuSSIon
The present work has synthesized a feasible framework using infor-
mation from various fields of brain sciences. This framework is 
then examined for the feasibility to support most of the functional 
requirements for maintaining a conscious state during which other 
brain functions can be carried out. In summary, the net semblance 
of activity from the sensory receptors occurring through the tran-
sient functional LINKs between the postsynapses by the back-
ground sensory receptor activations and neuronal oscillations is 
explained as the basis of consciousness. The factors that affect the 
functional LINKs should change the conformation of C-semblance 
and lead to different levels of consciousness modifying other brain 
functions that are dependent on C-semblance.
There are difficult questions that need to be answered. For 
example, can the proposed framework explain basic language com-
prehension? How does one consciously experience the meaning 
of the word “and”? Even though, a feasible explanation may be 
given as follows, is it sufficient? Based on the previous associative 
learning experience, different semblances for the word “and” are 
evoked. From them, the right one can be chosen, once we provide 
the nervous system with the context. Now, the items that need to Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    October 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 168  |  12
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